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A distinctive feature of Aquinas's Summa contra Gentiles
is the central role the author assigns to natural reason in his project
of manifesting the truth of Christian faith. Reason is supposed to give
a rational account of the truth of what faith professes about God, to
arrive at a veritas demonstrative!,) which will be shown to accord with
the Christian religion. It is mainly because of this emphatic and what
seems to be a rather presumptuous role of natural reason that the
work has occasioned so much discussion and, consequently, diversity
of opinion among the interpreters of Aquinas's thought. Is the Contra
Gentiles, insofar as reason is the leading principle of the investigation,
to be regarded as a kind of 'philosophical' summa) as it was sometimes
labeled in the past? The objection immediately arises that the fourth
book explicitly deals with those truths of faith which are above reason.
And further, on account of its declared subject-matter—the truth of
the Catholic faith—it seems unmistakably a theological work or, more
exactly, a work in which the truth of Christian faith is expounded
and defended. Those who stress the theological character of the work,
a work written from the point of view of faith, usually refer to what
seems to be the original title: "On the Truth of the Catholic Faith
against the Errors of the Infidels."1
1. In early manuscripts of the work the title used is "Liber de veritate catholicae
fΐdei contra errores inήdelium." See the Leonine edition of the Contra Gentiles in
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The riddle of the Contra Gentiles goes deeper than the question of
whether it is intended primarily as a theological or as a philosophical
work, based on reason as a common human faculty for truth. As
Pegis notes in his introduction to the English translation, the work
has posed two main problems for its interpreters.2 One concerns the
purpose and nature of the work with reference to the historical situ-
ation that occasioned it. What position does it take in the historical
encounter of the Latin West with the GrecoΊslamic philosophical
conception of the world? The second problem, according to Pegis,
concerns the internal organization of the Contra Gentiles. How are its
four books related to one another? What is its main point of view or
idea that inspires the work as a whole?
The commonly accepted view takes the Contra Gentiles foremost
as a work of Christian apologetics intending to give a rational de^
fense of faith against the Greco-Islamic philosophical picture of the
world. According to Pegis, the work is part of the Christian reaction
against Islamic intellectual culture, especially against Islamic Aris-
totelianism. And Chenu, in his well-known Introduction, regards it as
an "apologetic theology," a defense of the whole body of Christian
thought against the Greco-Islamic scientific conception of the world.3
Weisheipl agrees with this view: the author of this work must be
seen primarily as an apologist whose aim is to convince the learned
Muslims and Jews in Spain of the truth of the Christian faith and to
combat their erroneous opinions.4
The apologetic view of the Contra Gentiles can draw support from
an old tradition according to which Thomas was asked by Raymond
of Peήafort, the former master general of the Dominican Order, to
compose a work "against the errors of unbelievers" as an aid in
Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XΠl. P. M. edita (Rome, 1882- ), 13:xiib, and
the references in Mark D. Jordan, "The Protreptic Structure of the 'Summa contra
Gentiles'," The Thomist 50 (1986): 173-209, at p. 182, n. 31. It seems likely that this
long and awkward title has been abbreviated into "summa contra gentiles."
2. Summa contra Gentiles, trans. Anton C. Pegis et alii (Notre Dame, Ind.: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1975), General Introduction, p. 20.
3. Chenu, Introduction a Vetude de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 3rd ed. (Montreal: Institut
d'etudes medievales, and Paris: J. Vrin, 1974), p. 250.
4. James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d!Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work, rev.
ed. (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), p. 133.
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conversion. This story, the source of which is a chronicle written by
the Dominican Peter Marsilio in 1313, links the work with the train-
ing of Dominican missionaries for an apostolate among the learned
Muslims and Jews in Islamic Spain, who were thoroughly versed in
Aristotelian philosophy. In spite of its imaginative charm this testi-
mony seems to be no more than a piece of hagiographic invention.5
As Jordan remarks, the Contra Gentiles would be an odd missionary
manual by the Dominican standards of the thirteenth century. Con-
trary to the ideals of Dominican missionary activity, its author shows
very little familiarity with the religious beliefs and languages of his
adversaries. Chenu too qualifies the missionary and even apologetic
intention of the Contra Gentiles. It is clear, he says, that the work
exceeds by far the requirements of a simple missionary manual. It is
above all a work devoted to the contemplation of the truth ("une
oeuvre de contemplation de la verite")-6
According to Corbin, in his voluminous book on the development
of Aquinas's theological thought, the Contra Gentiles must be seen
as a strictly theological work, a work written for Christian believers
about the truth of their Catholic faith. It is Aquinas's "second com-
prehensive theological discourse," a second summa in which Aquinas
resumes and modifies the project of his first summa, the Scriptum,
in the light of the results of his methodological investigation in the
commentary on Boethius's De trinίtateJ Therefore Aquinas's intention
to combat the errors of the unbelievers is not to be taken as motivated
by any practical or apologetic urgency; it is but a secondary means of
manifesting more effectively the brightness of truth by contrasting it
with the darkness of falsehood.8
5. See Michel Corbin's critical analysis of the story about Raymond de Penafort in
he chemin de la theohgie chez Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974) and also the
extensive discussion in Jordan, "Protreptic Structure," pp. 174-182. Jordan concludes
that the circumstantial evidence does not really help us to understand the Contra
Gentiles.
6. Chenu, Introduction, p. 253.
7. Corbin, Chemin de la thέologie, p. 630.
8. Corbin, Chemin de la thέologie, p. 509. Rene-Antoine Gauthier takes the same
view in his "Introduction hίstorique" to Thomas d'Aquin, Somme contre les Gentils 1,
trans. R. Bernier and M. Corvez (Paris: Lethielleux, 1961) 1:87: "si dans ce propos
Perreur a sa place, ce n'est pas dans le mesure oύ elle est professee par des hommes,
c'est dans la mesure oύ par son contraste elle rend plus lumineuse la verite."
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Corbin's analysis of Aquinas's methodological reflection on the
problem of the autonomy of theology versus philosophical thought is
impressive and very subtle. His fundamental assumption is that the
three main works about Christian doctrine mark the different phases
on the road of Aquinas's theological development. Compared to the
Summa theologiae, Aquinas's final solution to the problem of the inner
unity of theology as science of faith, the theological concept of the
Contra Gentiles still shows an inner ambivalence on account of its
division of the truth of faith into a part accessible to reason and a part
not accessible. This inner rupture in its structure indicates that the
philosophical part is not yet adequately integrated in the theological
synthesis.
Within the scope of this essay we cannot fully do justice to Corbin's
complicated thesis. One can wonder, however, to what extent the
Contra Gentiles is comparable with the Summa theologiae in the light
of Aquinas's search for a satisfying conception of theology. The sug-
gestion that Aquinas, writing the earlier work, was seeking to solve
a problem he finally succeeded in solving when he wrote the later
one cannot claim any support from what he explicitly declares to be
his intention in the Contra Gentiles. I see no reason why the Contra
Gentiles should not be approached as a work in its own right, with
an intention different from the Summa theologiae and an intelligible
structure adapted to that intention. So it is not at all evident to me
that the Contra Gentiles must be regarded as 'theological' in the same
sense as the Summa theologiae is explicitly meant to be a theological
summa, nor as a summa in the sense of a comprehensive work dealing
with the whole of Christian doctrine.
The Contra Gentiles is a work in which the author intends to
manifest the truth of the Catholic faith. In order to proceed in a
disciplined and responsible way, so Aquinas remarks in the beginning
of 1.3, it is essential to determine by which method this truth can be
manifested. Faced with the truth of the things faith professes about
God, we are asked to consider how the truth of God is accessible to
our intellect. This reflection leads to a duplex modus veritatis (1.3),
a twofold mode of truth in the things we profess about God. Some
truths that "we" (the Christian community) profess about God exceed
the grasp of reason, as for example that he is one and three. Other
things we believe to be true about God can be known by natural
reason, namely things, such as God's existence and his unity, that
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have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the
light of natural reason. The division of the Contra Gentiles is based
on this twofold mode of truth. In the first three books natural reason
is the leading principle of the inquiry into the truth. Here reason
investigates the truth about God and the universe as perceived and
confirmed by faith. In the fourth book, however, Aquinas goes on to
discuss the truth of those elements of Christian doctrine which are
outside reason's natural competence. Aquinas's program of manifest-
ing the truth of what is professed by faith requires an acute sense of
the nature and limits of the human capacity for knowing the truth.
Reason has to be persuaded to make truth in itself not dependent
on its own power of understanding but rather to correct itself and
its forms of thought in order to understand, without any presumption
to comprehend, the higher intelligibility of faith. It is characteristic
of the Contra Gentiles that natural reason, in its search for truth, is
constantly reminded of its human point of departure. The work is
not only, in the first three books, an investigation of truth by means
of reason. It is also, throughout the whole work, an investigation of
reason itself in relation to the truth. Reason is that which investigates
and is itself investigated. I take this double role of reason as one of
the most distinctive features of the Contra Gentiles. Aside from the
idea of "truth in itself," natural reason is the main character in it.
In what follows I would like to focus on the role natural reason
plays in the Contra Gentiles and especially on the way Aquinas tries
to enlighten reason and to confront it with its human and creaturely
condition. In order to do this I will concentrate on Aquinas's discus-
sion of the relationship between faith and reason in the introductory
chapters and in the prologue of book 4- But first questions about the
author's intention and audience have to be considered.
THE OFFICE OF THOSE WHO ARE
WISE
The Contra Gentiles is, strictly speaking, neither a the-
ological nor a philosophical work. Although its subject matter may
be rightly characterized as theological and its method to a certain
extent as philosophical, both categories are nevertheless unsuitable for
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describing its proper point of view. For Aquinas, to argue theologically
means to argue from premises given by revelation. Theology is scientia
fidei, an argumentative and discursive exposition of the doctrine of
faith, in which reason fulfills an instrumental role, particularly with
regard to the so-called "praeambula fidei." The preambles include
what can be naturally known about God, those things the truth of
which is required and presupposed by faith, for instance that God
exists, that God is one, immaterial, and so on. The position of reason
in the Contra Gentiles is different from the one it occupies in the
"praeambula." This expression does not even occur. Aquinas does
make a distinction between truths about God which can be known by
natural reason and truths which exceed the power of reason. Yet this
distinction is based on the scope of natural reason and is formulated
without any reference to revelation.
The possibility of determining the scope of natural reason with
respect to the divine truth requires a standpoint that leaves room for
a critical assessment of reason's competence in divine matters. This
standpoint appears to be that of the wise. It is Aquinas's declared
intention to assume the task of someone wise (officium sapientis). With
this "office," Aquinas creates something new, an intellectual point of
view that is formally different from theology as well as philosophy.
In 1.1 ("Quid sit officium sapientis"), Aquinas describes the task of
those who are wise. On the basis of a few well-chosen references and
formulas he sketches in an ingenious way the intellectual perspective
of the wise. The fundamental idea is introduced right in the beginning
with the motto, taken from one of the wisdom books: "My mouth
shall meditate truth, and my lips shall hate impiety" (Proverbs 8:7).
These words, from the mouth of a personified Wisdom, suggest a
twofold office for someone wise, namely, to meditate and speak forth
divine truth and to refute opposed error. Someone wise is first and
foremost interested in the question of truth—and not of any truth,
just the truth of the first principle. As it belongs to those who are
wise to consider the truth claimed by human opinions and beliefs,
so it belongs to them to refute any opposing falsehood, that is, the
opinions that wrongly claim to be true.
The office of the wise is introduced without any reference to faith
and faith's claim to truth. The point of view of the wise concerns
the truth and nothing but the truth. It is only in 1.2 that Aquinas
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connects the "truth" with how the Christian tradition concretely per^
ceives the truth. The officium as he intends to pursue it is formulated
as follows: to make known the truth that the Catholic faith professes
and to set aside the errors that are opposed to it.
The leading point of view in the Contra Gentiles can be circum-
scribed as the sapiential interest in the truth of what Christians
confess about God. The sapiens is defined as one who considers human
beliefs and opinions about the meaning of the universe in the light of
their 'truth value'. Significantly, Aquinas does not use the expression
"Catholic truth," as he does in the prologue of the Summa (where he
calls himself a doctor of Catholic truth). The one who is wise does not
expound a sacred doctrine; he does not consider the meaning reality
has in the light of divine revelation. He is particularly concerned
with the truth that the Catholic faith professes.9 His starting point
lies at the human level of how people think of the truth and what
they profess to be the truth, however much authorized by a divine
revelation. The sapiens does not proceed from the truth itself as
revealed in Scripture. He examines human opinions and beliefs, even
if they are based on revelation, in the light of the truth. He argues,
collects arguments, and most of all he examines arguments in the
light of the truth, since his expertise permits him to discriminate and
to judge the arguments pro and contra. It is especially important to
emphasize this human point of departure. Only at the level of faith as
a human articulation and a religious embodiment of a revealed truth
is it possible to confront the claims of faith with alternative claims
made by those outside the Christian community, and to investigate
faith's truth by means of human reason.
To be wise is to consider things in the light of truth. This truth is
what Aquinas calls the "truth of the universe," the final end to which
all things are ordered. This end is the ultimate meaning of reality,
especially of human life. In 1.2 it becomes clear that the "truth of
the universe" has been given a normative and substantial expression
in the fides catholica. This, at least, is what Aquinas believes, and it is
from this point of view that he assumes his office. The term "officium"
9. Ψrofitetur* means to speak forward, to declare openly that something is true.
See also 1.9: "veritatis, quam fides profitetur et ratio investigat." In citing or quoting
from the Summa contra Gentiles, I use the edition of Ceslaus Pera, Petrus Marc, and
Petrus Caramello (Turin: Marietti and Paris: Lethiellux, 1961-1967).
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refers to a public task,10 Someone who holds an 'officium' is charged
with a task or duty directed to others, for the benefit of the community
he lives in. For Aquinas, this community is the Christian community
of believers (fideles)> which is based on the truth-consensus of faith.
Aquinas's way of speaking about truth may sound rather pretentious
to our ears. If he assumes that the Catholic faith, by divine guarantee,
is the expression of the truth, so that each deviation from this faith
is necessarily a deviation from the truth, what can he do, acting
as one who is wise, but simply repeat and reconfirm the traditional
formulas of faith? Or does Aquinas, as a wise man, pretend to have a
privileged access to the truth itself? Is the wise person someone who
knows the truth? I do not think Aquinas would put it in this way.
Someone wise is not in full possession of wisdom, but one whose task
it is to make known, in whatever way, the truth as professed and
claimed by the Catholic faith. In other words, Aquinas proposes to
show, to his fellow believers, that the Catholic claim to truth can in
fact be understood and self-consciously affirmed, against the numerous
alternative claims, as a reasonable claim to truth. Aquinas does not
pretend to have an immediate access to truth itself, by transcending
the human point of view from which any rational investigation of
truth proceeds.11 The beliefs and opinions of people about the "truth
of the universe" are open to a critical evaluation and assessment,
not by an appeal to an intuition of truth, but by examining those
opinions in the light of the logical basis—for example natural reason
or an authoritative expression given to it (the writings of Aristotle!)—
on which people actually base their claims. Neither reason nor faith
provides an immediate access to the truth. Every hold on truth and
every expression given to it in human discourse is mediated by the
world of sense-experience to which our intellect is naturally directed.
10. An officium, Aquinas explains in Summa theol. 2-2.183.3 ad 2, implies that
one carries out an activity that is related to others ("actus qui referuntur ad alios").
For instance both a doctor and a judge hold an officium. Aquinas refers to Isidore's
Etymologiae 6.19 (PL 82:252). Isidore there explains 'officium' etymologically as doing
things that are not offensive to anyone, but beneficial for all ("officium est ut quisque
ilia agat quae nulli officiant, id est noceant, sed prosint omnibus"). The relation to
others as a part of the office is mentioned by Aquinas explicitly in Summa contra
Gentiles 1.1 ("aliis disserere").
11. Recall the remark in Summa contra Gentiles 3.48 (Pera no. 2258): "Non igitur
homines in cognitione veritatis sic se habent quasi in ultima fine existentes."
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Aquinas's point of departure is the "truth of the universe" as for-
mulated, reflected on, preached, and experienced in the faith of the
Christian community. There exists a Catholic consensus about truth
based on Scripture and tradition. Yet this consensus of the community
of believers is never a totally undisputed and unrivalled possession of
truth. The Christian community in the thirteenth century saw its own
convictions and beliefs confronted with other claims to truth, which
by their very existence called the claim of faith into question. These
are the errores infideliumy the more or less persuasive claims to truth
that are contrary to the Catholic consensus. Out of respect for the
truth these errors are to be taken with all seriousness. They are not
simply to be disregarded as evidence of malice or stupidity. It belongs
to the task of those who are wise to discuss these alternative claims,
to analyze how it came about that reason falsely convinced itself of
its truth, and to set them aside as unjustified and untrue. This is their
office, their service for the benefit of the Christian community of
believers, which is now able to appropriate self-consciously the truth
it confesses over against the erroneous claims of others.
It seems to me that Aquinas's immediate aim is not to prove the
validity of the Catholic claim before others (infideles). His office is
not one of missionary activity aiming at conversion. On the contrary,
the office is needed because of the threatening effect the various
errors have on the Christian consciousness of truth. Natural reason,
according to its historical reality in Greco-Islamic philosophy, calls
the Christian perception of truth into question. In this sense, the
Contra Gentiles seems to me comparable to Maimonides' Guide of the
Perplexed.12 The Guide is meant for the educated Jew who experiences
difficulties in reconciling the traditional faith and law as the basis for
Jewish life with the Aristotelian philosophical view of the world.
Maimonides' intention is that the law may be understood by the way
of truth (per viam veritatis); his aim is to show the intellectual Jew a
way of reading and appreciating the spiritual truth of Scripture behind
its anthropomorphic and symbolic appearance, which causes so many
perplexities. Both the Guide and the Contra Gentiles are addressed to
a community of believers living in a determinate historical constella-
tion. In both communities the sayings of Scripture have a normative
12. See Jordan, "Protreptic Structure," p. 196, who points to some interesting
similarities and some dissimilarities between the Guide and the Contra Gentiles.
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force for the spiritual and moral life of believers. Both Maimonides
and Aquinas are engaged in interpreting the sayings of Scripture, not
in the sense of biblical exegesis, but in an exegesis that aims at a
rational appreciation of the deeper truth of Scripture. At the end of
each chapter of the Contra Gentiles a passage from Scripture is given
to confirm the truth found by reason. It confirms that the truth of
reason is not set aside by the higher intelligibility of Scripture, which
is founded in the divine truth itself.
REASON AND THE EXISTENCE OF
OTHERS'
The officium of the wise is not as such necessarily com-
mitted to reason as the way of giving the truth of faith a rational
expression. Aquinas introduces natural reason in answer to the exis-
tence of 'others', outside the Christian community, who do not accept
the authority of Scripture and whose counterclaims, therefore, cannot
be refuted successfully on the basis of Scripture. One of the problems
Aquinas sees himself confronted with is that some people, "such as
Mohammedans and pagans," do not have a holy book in common
with Christians (nobiscum) on the basis of which disputes in matters
of truth can be settled. Therefore, he concludes, in order to deal
with the errors of these 'others,' we must have recourse (recurrere)
to natural reason, since all are forced to give their assent to reason.
Reason is a kind of common ground and provides Aquinas with a
common language that enables him to discuss the truth in a way
compelling to the opponent of faith.
Aquinas clearly opts for natural reason by way of strategy in order to
deal with erroneous opinions of non-Christians, not because reason
is thought to be superior. In fact, natural reason is even deficient
(deficiens) in respect to "divine matters." But the fact that some hold
opinions, based on rational thought, that are contrary to Christian
faith is a motive for Aquinas to descend to the common ground of
reason and to speak the same language, the language of a philosophical
discourse on the "truth of the universe." This strategy leads to the
general program of the Contra Gentiles, formulated as follows: "while
we are investigating some truth, we shall also show what errors are set
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aside by it; and we shall likewise show how the demonstrative truth
(veritas demonstrativa) is in accordance with the Christian religion."13
In the Contra Gentiles, at least in the first three books, Aquinas
enters by way of strategy into the discourse of reason and employs
the language of the philosophi. This appears even from the choice
of arguments and the use of a specific philosophical vocabulary. For
instance, the treatment of the divine essence in book 1 relies heav-
ily on the metaphysics of Avicenna. Without mentioning his name
Aquinas borrows several arguments from Avicenna. He even speaks
about God's simplicity in terms of "necesse esse," which is particularly
striking as this formula is completely absent in the Summa theologiaeM
Apparently, the investigation of the truth of what faith professes by
means of reason is not a process of inventing new arguments without
any precedent but more one of appropriating and reformulating the
available arguments of the philosophers whose writings give witness
to what reason can investigate with respect to the truth of God.
Another typical example of the language of natural reason in the
Contra Gentiles is the word 'felicitas', a term used in the Latin transla-
tion of Aristotle's Ethics. 'Felicitas' refers to natural human happiness,
the ultimate human perfection that can be reached in virtue of natural
powers. This natural happiness, as conceived by the philosophers,
consists in contemplating the truth as perfectly as possible within
the limits of earthly life.15 iBeatitudo\ on the other hand, is a typical
word of faith. It refers to the Christian view of happiness as something
that consists in the vision of God which is expected to come in a
future life by divine grace. So when Aquinas comes to speak about the
necessity of grace for human perfection (3.147, "Quod homo indiget
divino auxilio ad beatitudinem consequendam"), he uses 'beatitudo'A&
13. Summa contra Gentiles 1.2: "Simul autem veritatem aliquam investigantes
ostendemus, qui errores per earn excludantur; et quomodo demonstrativa veritas fidei
christianae religionis concordet."
14. See Summa contra Gentiles 1.15, 1.16, 1.18, 1.19 and particularly 1.22, on
the identity of essence and esse in God. This last chapter, as Weisheipl remarked, is
almost a paraphrase of Avicenna's Metaphysica 8.4 (Friar Thomas d!Aquino, p. 133).
15. See Summa theol. 1.62.1: "Una (ultima perfectio) quidem, quam potest assequi
virtute suae naturae: et haec quodammodo beatitudo vel felicitas dicitur."
16. Earlier, in 3.25 (Pera no. 2068), Aquinas mentions in one passage both
"beatitudo" and "felicitas." The first is connected with a text from Matthew 5:8:
"Blessed (beati) are the pure in heart, for they will see God"; the second, with
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Aquinas is fully aware of a distinctive language and vocabulary of
the philosophi as opposed to the language of Christian faith- He writes
here from a point of view that never loses sight of this distinction.
It is part of the strategic motivation that Aquinas does not surren-
der completely to natural reason. Reason does not play the role of
judge, standing above the claims of believers and unbelievers. Reason
is in fact claimed by one of the parties, the one in which the errors
against the Christian faith are to be found. Aquίnas's acceptance of
reason goes together with the recognition that on numerous issues
the claims of reason, as embodied in the opinions of philosophers,
conflict with the Catholic consensus about truth. His intention is to
show that in the erroneous opinions reason is in fact entangled in
error and has arrived at conclusions that are incorrectly derived from
the basic principles by which reason proceeds in its understanding of
truth. The investigation by means of reason is at the same time an
investigation of reason itself according to its concrete embodiment in
the philosophical doctrines with which Aquinas was acquainted.
Who, then, are these 'others', the infideles7. And in what sense
can Aquinas be said to address himself to them? In his book about
Aquinas's conception of theology, Patfoort argues that the Contra
Gentiles is a comprehensive teaching of Christian doctrine to be read
by believers in order that they may explain and defend the truth of
faith to non-Christians. The work should be seen as a presentation
of Christian doctrine for the purpose of an ecumenical debate ("une
tentative d'oecumenisme") between Christians and the learned Mus-
lims and Jews in Spain.17 Patfoort sees evidence for the missionary
intention in Aquinas's use of the phrase "to convince the adversary"
(1.9). Here Aquinas explains how he proposes to proceed. First, he
intends to treat those truths of faith which are within reason's compe-
tence. With respect to this kind of divine truth, he will bring forward
Aristotle's Ethics. From 3.25 on, Aquinas uses the term "felicitas" almost exclusively,
except, for instance, in 3.62 (Pera no. 2376), where "beatitudo" is used in connection
with an erroneous opinion of Origen, who in spite of his being a heretic still belongs
to the Christian tradition.
17. Albert Patfoort, Thomas d'Aquin: Les cles d'une thέobgie (Paris: FAC-editions,
1983), p. 105: "Bref la Summa contra Gentiles serait une ecole de presentation aux
infideles de la foi chretienne, une tentative d'oecumenisme, avant la lettre, entre
chretiens et infideles."
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both demonstrative and probable arguments, "by which our adversary
may become convinced." Then, in book 4, those truths will be dealt
with which exceed the power of reason, in which case we ought not
to try to convince the adversary by arguments but only to answer his
arguments and objections against the truth.
Are these words to be understood in the sense that Aquinas intends
to provide a collection of arguments for his fellow-believers in order
that they may effectively persuade the unbeliever of the truth of the
Christian faith? Is to convince the same as to convert by rational
means? Patfoort takes 'convincere* in the subjective sense of persuasion.
He is not much impressed by the difficulty with which Gauthier
confronted him, namely, that in medieval Latin 'convincere* does not
yet have the modern meaning of "persuading someone to believe that
something is true or false."18 In its medieval use, 'convincere' should
be taken in a more objective sense as referring to the outcome of a
logical process of argument that is compelling for all the participants
in the dispute, regardless of whether some of them feel subjectively
convinced. According to the rules of a scholastic disputation the
opponent is forced to give his assent when the conclusion is shown
to follow logically from premises on which both partners agree. Con-
vincere does not appeal to the will, as does rhetorical persuasion, but
to the intellect. By the logical force of the argument the intellect is
compelled to give its assent.19
Therefore I cannot agree with the view put forward by Jordan
either.20 According to him, the division into two types of truth has
"a rhetorical motivation" and separates two "possibilities for effective
18. Patfoort, Thomas d'Aquin, p. 114, n. 19.
19. See for example Saiptum super Sent. 3.24.2.2a arg. 4, ed. Pierre Mandonnet
and M. F. Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-1947), no. 40: "omnis probatio convincens
intellectum ad assentiendum facit scientiam"; Summa theoL 1-2.51.3 co (Opera omnia
[Leonine] 6:328b): "una propositio per se nota convincit intellectum ad assentiendum
firmiter conclusioni"; and 2-2.4.1 co (8:44a): "per auctoritatem divinam intellectus
convincitur ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei." These texts, which are cited by
Patfoort (Thomas d'Aquin, p. 117) to underline his 'subjective' view of convincere,
clearly favor the Objective' sense. As it is the self-evident proposition which logically
founds the truth of the conclusion, and which in virtue of this logical foundation
compels the intellect, so it is the authority of God, revealing himself in Holy
Scripture, which is the logical ground for us to give our assent to the truth of faith.
20. See Jordan, "Protreptic Structure," pp. 173-209.
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persuasion." As based on the distinction between the realm in which
reason can be persuaded by demonstration and one in which reason
can be addressed but not conclusively persuaded, Aquinas's program is
formulated "in terms of a rhetorical or pedagogical efficacy." However,
contrary to Patfoort, Jordan does not think Aquinas's intention is
to convince directly the prospective convert, but to show rather to
believers how an adversary could be convinced. "As it teaches believers
how to persuade, the Contra Gentiles must also persuade believers to
become habituated in the whole of Christian wisdom."21
It seems to me misleading to read in the use of convincere an inten-
tion of rhetorical persuasion. The twofold mode of truth is primarily
a logical division, a division of the truth claims of faith into one part
that can be demonstratively made known as true in the light of natural
reason and another, the truth of which cannot be made known in the
light of reason. Reason derives its force and capacity for truth from
first and self-evident principles, which are constitutive for our human,
sense-mediated mode of knowing the truth. So by the logical force of
its principles the human intellect knows the truth of those things that
fall under the senses. What transcends the domain of sense-experience
can be known only in so far as its knowledge is implied in the very
intelligibility of sensible things. Through the rational procedure of
demonstration, therefore, one can never conceptually grasp the truth
of God himself. The light of reason cannot make the truth of God
as such present to our intellect. Only in this sense might rational
arguments have a persuasive force for the believer, since reason does
not contribute to the inner truth and certainty of faith—the truth of
which is founded in God's knowledge of himself (prima veritas)—but
only to the way the truth of faith can be appropriated within the
domain of human experience and understanding.22
21. Jordan, "Protreptic Structure," p. 190.
22. It is against this background that the great number of arguments, so character-
istic for the Contra Gentiles, must be understood. By the fact that for each articulated
aspect of the divine truth the reader is given a series of diverse arguments, taken from
the writings of the philosophers and the Christian doctors, he becomes aware that no
argument as such is capable of conceptualizing adequately the intended truth itself,
but is a more or less convincing way of leading the human intellect to a rational
understanding of the truth of faith. In each chapter the truth under discussion is not
defined by the logical conclusiveness of any singular argument.
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One cannot conclude from the phrase "to convince an adversary"
that the Contra Gentiles is meant to support a historical debate of
Christian missionaries with Islamic and Jewish intellectuals. It seems
very unlikely that in Aquinas's mind the 'adversaries' stood for a
historically definable group of people. He was much more interested
in the content of the errors, in the fact that they represent actual
possibilities of rational thought, which can produce in the mind of
people false conceptions of God (and thus of a false god). The list
of errors is not restricted to contemporary thought. The errors are
attributed to the ancient natural philosophers, to the "Platonists," to
Avicenna and Averroes (they are not in all respects trustworthy guides
in interpreting Aristotle), to heretics like Origen and the Manichees,
but most of all simply to "quidam," to anonymous teachers who hold
a more or less reasonable opinion, based on philosophical principles,
that conflicts with the truth of Christian faith. They are all formally
adversarii so far as they hold an opinion that objectively calls into
question the truth as confessed by the Christian community ("quae
de Deo confitemur"). So a manifestation of the truth of faith would
only be successful if the opposed error is shown to be an error. When
the opponent bases his claim on reason, the only way to combat
this erroneous claim is by means of reason, by showing with rational
arguments that in the light of truth reason must correct itself.
Reason, however, is not simply a timeless, a priori logical basis
for deciding conflicting truth claims in history. Natural reason itself
is a historical entity in the sense that the masters of the medieval
university learned what natural reason is and should be from reading
and assimilating the writings of Aristotle, Avicenna, and others. This
means that natural reason was not neutral in respect to the truth.
Reason was connected with a philosophically elaborated picture of the
"truth of the universe." The great theological debates of the thirteenth
century were all about elements of this picture that were felt to be
contrary to the traditional Christian view, such as the eternity of the
world, the unity of the intellect, and the nature of human happiness.
In the process of assimilating the Aristotelian corpus the medievals
were confronted with claims of reason that they could not accept.
Aquinas's strategy is to discuss and combat the claims in the light of
reason's own criteria and rules learned from the philosophi themselves.
In so far as faith not only requires confession, but also reflection
and understanding in order to be a human faith, Aquinas shows the
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believer how philosophical' reason can be assimilated if only reason is
brought to correct its errors and false pretentions and becomes aware
of its human point of view in relation to the truth of faith.
The investigation of reason as embodied in philosophical thought is
especially directed at those issues which are typical of the rationalistic
spirit of Greco-Islamic philosophy. The work includes themes such as
cosmological determinism versus the Christian perception of human
morality (arguments against fate, against a determining influence of
the stars on the human acts of will and intellect), Islamic necessitar-
ianism versus God's freedom in creation (non per necessitatem naturae
sed per υoluntatem) and the certainty of God's providence without this
imposing necessity on the course of things. Another point of interest
is Aquinas's concern to reconcile the absolute simplicity of God's
essence with his knowing and willing many things. These are just a
few examples to illustrate which philosophical ideas are envisaged and
denounced by Aquinas in the Contra Gentiles and how he seeks to
purify reason from its necessitarianism in order to integrate rational
thought in his exposition of the Christian perception of the "truth of
the universe."
THE TWOFOLD CONDITION OF
NATURAL REASON: THE HUMAN
CONDITION OF REASON
A crucial question preliminary to the project of the
Contra Gentiles asks to what extent reason can be integrated in the
Christian perception of truth without its character as a faith-based
relation to the truth being dissolved. Can reason be convinced of
the reasonableness, even of the necessity, of holding something in
faith? This question as to whether it is fitting (with regard to what
in human nature is rational) to hold a truth in faith is dealt with
in 1.4-5 according to the twofold division of truth. With respect to
both types of truth an apparently very reasonable objection can be
made. First, an inspired doctrine proposed to human beings for belief
would seem rather useless (frustra) within the realm of what naturally
can be known about God, since reason can handle it sufficiently by
itself. Second, human beings should not be asked to believe what
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their reason cannot investigate. The divine Wisdom has endowed
human nature with reason, which should be sufficient for it to attain
the knowledge of God required for its perfection. In both objections
natural human reason claims to be self-sufficient in matters of truth,
even with the help of an argument based on divine providence.
A reason that cannot tolerate our being asked to hold something
on faith represents a veritable Trojan horse for the Christian commu-
nity. If reason were justified in its claim to autonomy, the only way
Christianity could affirm its faith would be by rejecting reason, by
excluding rational reflection based on philosophy. Aquinas chooses
not to go along that way. It is his conviction that natural reason can
be integrated in the Christian consciousness of truth, but not unless
reason gives up its claim to autonomy and acknowledges its human
condition in knowing the truth. Not reason as such, but the presump-
tion of reason to have an absolute hold on truth prevents a reasonable
understanding of the truth of faith. So the issue is not a defense of the
'reasonableness' of Christian faith before reason. Aquinas's objective
is to confront natural reason with its own condition, to make reason
aware of its limitations in order to prevent reason from unreflectively
imposing its own limits on the search for truth. We need more truth
than our reason can grasp.
According to Aquinas, three awkward consequences would follow
if the truth about God that can be known naturally were left solely
as a matter of inquiry for human reason. These consequences all
concern the human condition of reason. Reason is embodied in human
life, is a part of the human being, which does not coincide with its
reason. First, the exercise of reason depends on external conditions
that are not equal for all human beings. Some people do not have
the physical disposition required for a rational inquiry into the truth.
Not everyone is naturally gifted with intellectual powers sufficient
to pursue the highest level of knowledge. Others are prevented from
contemplating the truth in matters divine by the necessities of daily
life. Not everyone has the leisure for contemplative inquiry, which is
required for arriving at the highest peak of human knowledge. Finally,
there are some who are cut off by indolence (pigritia), that is, human
inertia. For in order to arrive at knowledge of God, a knowledge
of many things must already be possessed. The whole of philosophy
has to be learned to prepare oneself for the highest philosophical
discipline of metaphysics, which deals with divine things. It has to
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be recognized that not everyone wishes to carry out such a great
intellectual labor for the mere love of knowledge.
The second reason why it would be inconvenient to make the
knowledge of God dependent solely on natural reason concerns the
condition of reason itself. As a part of human life reason requires a
great deal of training and education. The process of education takes
time. In order to grasp the truth by means of rational inquiry, reason
needs a long training—not only the reason of the individual, passing
from turbulent and foolish youth to the ripeness and wisdom of old
age, but also reason in its historical development. The history of phi-
losophy bears witness to the slow development of philosophical reason
towards a more profound and metaphysical view of the nature of
reality. As Aquinas remarks in Summa theologίae 1.44.2, "the ancient
philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced in the
knowledge of truth." Only after a long time and with great difficulty
is human intellect made capable of thinking from a metaphysical
perspective about the truth of God.
The third awkward consequence concerns the results of human
reasoning. Rational investigation does not lead infallibly to true re-
sults. Owing to the weakness of the power of judgment and to the
admixture of sense-images, reason's true conclusions will be mixed
with errors. Even if some conclusions are demonstratively proven,
not all people are sufficiently versed in logic to be able to judge the
power of demonstration and to discern valid demonstrations from
probable or sophistical arguments. Certitude is not only a matter of
logically correct reasoning, but most of all of human appreciation
and assessment of the logical conclusiveness of an argument. "That
is why it was necessary that the unshakeable certitude and pure truth
concerning divine things should be presented to men by way of
faith."23
The message of Contra Gentiles 1.4 is that reason is a human
capacity, embedded in concrete human life, and that therefore it
is not convenient to make the human perception of the "truth of
the universe" dependent solely on the inquiry of reason. So from the
point of view of the human condition of reason, the factual claim of
23. Summa contra Gentiles 1.4: "Et ideo oportuit, per viam fΐdei, fixa certitudine,
ipsam veritatem de rebus divinis hominibus exhiberi."
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Christianity to have a divinely inspired doctrine does make sense and
should not be condemned as unintelligible.
THE CREATURELY CONDITION OF
THE REASON
It is not immediately evident why we should believe
something on the authority of divine revelation, the truth of which
cannot be examined by reason because it is said to be above reason.
What could be the meaning of this 'above' for human reason? Why
is the truth of faith called 'supra-rational' and not simply irrational,
outside the categories of reason? Only when reason realizes its crea-
turely condition in knowing the truth can it acknowledge something
beyond its power as having nevertheless the character of truth. The
revelation of something that exceeds the power of reason has the
beneficial effect of confronting reason with its creaturely condition,
of making reason aware that truth as such is not defined by its own
rational comprehension of truth.
The central issue of Contra Gentiles 1.5 is the limitedness of natural
reason in relation to the truth. In the first argument Aquinas's point
is that reason may not impose its own limits on human desire. We are
directed to a higher good than human fragility can experience in the
present life. The human mind must be "called to something higher
than our reason" ("evocari in aliquid altius quam ratio nostra") in
order that we learn to direct our desire to a higher end than reason
can experience.
The second argument put forward by Aquinas is a most interesting
and difficult one to understand. His point is that reason should think
correctly about God. Since God's substance surpasses the natural
knowledge of which human beings are capable, reason is persuaded to
think about God as something that exceeds its conceptions. By the
very fact that some things about God are proposed to human beings
for belief, reason becomes aware of its limits in relation to the truth
of God. It is brought to think about God as being above everything
that reason can think. So the very fact that some truths are revealed
that go beyond reason makes reason reflect on its limits and correct
its view of God—not in the sense that revelation provides reason
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with new information, but in the sense that reason comes to a new
understanding of what it means to have a conception about God at
all. Confronted with the supranational claim of faith reason acquires
a Socratic insight into how its conceptual knowledge is related to
God's truth. Reason knows God to be beyond its knowledge of God
(sciat se Deum nescire).2^
The next argument also concerns the limits of reason. Some, so
Aquinas says, have such a presumptuous opinion of their own rational
ability that they deem themselves able to measure the nature of ev^
erything. It is the presumption that the capacity of reason imposes its
own measure on the truth itself. Especially in book 4 the presumption
of reason is a recurring motif. According to Aquinas, this presumption
arises from a misunderstanding of reason with respect to its own
capacity for truth. Reason thinks itself to be the source of truth.
From this rationalistic presumption the human mind might be freed
by a perspective on truth that surpasses reason.
In the last argument Aquinas turns against those who, out of
falsely conceived humility, argue that human beings should restrict
themselves to earthly matters and leave the divine matters to God
alone. Once again, reason should not restrict the human quest for
truth to its own capacity. Aquinas cites with approval the remark of
Aristotle: "man should draw himself towards what is immortal and
divine as much as he can." There is more truth to be known than
human reason can handle.
CAN REASON RECOGNIZE ITSELF IN
FAITH'S INTELLIGIBILITY?
If reason, aware of its own condition, cannot and may
not reject a faith-based claim for truth, then the next question arises
24. This is an Anselmian motif, as in Proslogion 15, in Opera omnia, ed. Franciscus
Salesius Schmitt (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1946-1961), 1:112: "Ergo,
Domine, non solum es quo maius cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam maius quam
cogitari possit." See also Thomas Aquinas Quaestiones disputatae De potentia 7.5 ad
14, ed. Paulus M. Pession in Quaestiones disputatae ίί, 10th ed. (Turin and Rome:
Marietti, 1965), p. 60b: "illud est ultimum cognitionis humanae de Deo quod sciat
se Deum nescire, inquantum cognoscit, illud quod Deus est, omne ipsum quod de
eo inteiligimus, excedere."
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whether the believer's holding something in faith really corresponds to
an objective truth. Is it not just foolishness to place one's faith in the
truth of "wonderful stories" 2 5 that are beyond human experience? It is
clear that reason does not have access to the logical ground on which
the truth of faith is based. But does faith have its own reasons or is it
just 'wishful thinking' ? Aquinas counts as legitimate reason's concern
that people should not frivolously believe what they have heard.
The question of levity in 1.6 does not, as one might think at first
sight, concern the credibility of faith, as if to justify the believer's
act of faith. Aquinas is not so much interested in the typical modern
question, "Is it rational to give assent to what is proposed to me for
belief?" It is not a matter of the subjective evidence on the part of
the believer, but of whether the subjective belief that something is
true corresponds to an objective truth. Only when faith is related to
an objective truth, not essentially different from the truth of reason
(see 1.7), can reason be expected to investigate the truth claims of
faith and to refute objections against it. Even when faith is said to
be above reason, it cannot lack truth, without which it would be
foolish to believe, nor have a different kind of truth, which would
contradict human reason. So the question posed by Aquinas in 1.6-7
is preliminary to his project in the Contra Gentiles: How can reason
recognize itself in the truth of faith?
His answer comes down to the simple observation that in the
history of the Christian religion human reason has apparently rec-
ognized itself in the proclaimed faith. It is very unlikely that the
Christian faith should be based on fables invented for credulous peo-
ple. The divine origin and the truthfulness of the Christian message
have been confirmed, not only by way of miracles but also, more
convincingly, by the inspiration given to human minds, "so that
simple and untutored persons come to possess the highest wisdom
and the readiest eloquence." 2 6 Aquinas's point is that the wisdom
of the apostles, which was not esoteric but public and therefore
open for human reason to assess its character as wisdom, cannot
25. Summa contra Gentiles 1.6 (Pera no. 35): "quasi doctas fabulas secuti, ut II Petri
(1,16) dicitur."
26. Summa contra Gentiles 1.6 (Pera no. 37): "et, quod est mίrabilius, humanarum
mentium inspiratione, ut idiotae et simplices, dono Spiritus sancti repleti, summam
sapientiam et facundiam in instanti consequerentur."
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be explained in a purely human way (e.g., by education). Further,
by the arguments of this inspired wisdom many people, both simple
and learned, became convinced and converted to Christian faith.
They were not persuaded by the force of arms or by the promise of
pleasure; even in the midst of the tyranny of persecutors they chose to
join the Christian movement. Could it be by any other motive than
the force of truth? Christian faith preaches values that are contrary
to the 'natural' human inclination to the visible and material world.
So evidently it was not 'worldly' motives that led so many people to
accept the truth of faith. On the contrary, people were asked to give
up the pleasures of the flesh and the things of the world in order to
set their hopes on something invisible. Evidently they were willing
to do so, not because they were all stupid or misled, but because they
recognized the inner truth and felt convinced by it.
Still the possibility exists that faith has a different kind of truth,
a different 'logic' than that of rational thought. We are told that the
truths of faith surpass the human intellect. But what if they simply
contradict the logic of our rational minds? According to Aquinas, the
exercise of human reason is made possible by some basic principles,
the truth of which is known naturally. Those principles cannot be
thought to be false since they are constitutive of rational thought
and human understanding of truth. Now if the truth claimed by the
Christian faith were opposed to a truth of reason, we could not accept
them both as true, since our rational nature makes this impossible.
We would have to give up our nature if we were asked to accept
contrary opinions as true.
This kind of conflict, however, is quite improbable, since it would
mean a conflict in God himself. As a created faculty human reason
is related to the truth according to principles that are not established
by reason itself, but by the transcendent source of all truth. Only
when we realize that natural reason is not an independent source of
truth will it become clear that in principle there cannot be a conflict
between the claims of reason and the truth of faith. It is impossible
for faith to have a 'logic' of its own, a logic that would be irrational to
the eyes of reason. Even if reason cannot demonstrate fully the truth
of what faith professes, it still can appreciate its higher intelligibility
by reflecting on the traces and likenesses of the divine mystery within
the sensible world. When reason gives up its presumption to be the
measure of the truth, it can pursue its quest for truth beyond the
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limits of rational demonstration. The mystery of God is not a mystery
because it defeats the attempts of reason to understand, but because
its truth attracts reason beyond its comprehension.
THE THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE
ABOUT GOD
With the transition to book 4, the critical point in
the plan of the Contra Gentiles has arrived. Now the method of
investigating the truth of what faith confesses by means of reason
does not suffice any more. In book 4 Aquinas intends to deal with
those elements of faith's confession about God which are beyond
human experience, beyond what natural reason can investigate. Faith
professes the mystery of God as the "truth of the universe" accord-
ing to three parts: first, the confession that God is one and three;
second, the mystery of the incarnation of God's son; and third, the
resurrection of human bodies together with the everlasting happiness
of human souls. Human experience can offer no evidence for these
claims. What now can be the task of reason? Must it be silenced
before the supra-rational truth of faith?
The transition to the supra-rational truths of faith gives Aquinas
cause to assume the duplex modus from the beginning in order to clarify
the epistemological basis of this division in truth with respect to our
intellect. What faith professes about God can be verified in the light
of reason only to a certain extent. Why is this? Because it is connatural
to the human intellect to derive its knowledge from sensible things.
Departing from sensible things, it cannot arrive through itself at a
proper concept of God's essence. Only by reflecting on the intelligible
order that reason perceives in the sensible world is it led to some
knowledge of God as the first principle and cause of all being. Since
the way human reason follows in its search for truth clearly does not
suffice to manifest the whole truth of what faith professes, there must
be a different way by which the truth of faith supra rationem comes
down to us. Aquinas has thus far left the nature of this second "way"
in the dark. At the beginning of book 4, he must make clear what
the proper logical foundation of this supra-rational truth is and how
this truth is given to us.
In the prologue of book 4, Aquinas describes two ways given to
human beings for attaining some knowledge of God. The first way
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is through creation (via per creaturas), the second through revelation
(via per revelationem). Both ways are forms of mediation. Each effects a
mediate union between the knower and the known, the human intel-
lect and the divine substance. For both ways the divine truth (veritas
divina) is but mediately present to the human intellect. The intellect
is related to God through articulated claims, the truth of which it does
not know in the light of God's own truth. The two ways correspond
to reason and faith as the two logical' forms under which divine
truth can become present in human discourse. It becomes present not
perfectly, but only in an anticipatory and still darkened' way. In the
case of the way per creaturas> the medium is the hierarchical order of
natures in the world, the result from God's providential plan. This
medium not only presents an imperfect likeness of God's essence, it is
known adequately by the human intellect only with great difficulty.
Human beings can reach only a faint knowledge of God by pursuing
the way upward in creation with reason. As the perfect knowledge
of God is the end of human existing, and since human beings, as
creatures, cannot remain idle, a second way to God through revelation
accords perfectly with the divine goodness. "In order that man might
have a firmer knowledge of Him, God revealed certain things about
Himself that transcend the human intellect."27 The insufficiency of
natural reason with respect to the perfect knowledge of God is one
motive for God's descending through revelation to human knowledge.
Even the knowledge handed down to us through revelation remains
imperfect, however, since the way of revelation too is 'mediated' by
our sense-bound susceptibility. What comes to us by revelation is re-
ceived according to the mode of our nature. Revelation is not a voice
from heaven. It does not produce an immediate encounter between
human beings and God. God's revelation, according to Aquinas,
comes to us within the visible world in the form of speech (per
modum locutίonis). God's word is made known through the speaking of
prophets and apostles, through preaching that aims to instill faith in
those listening. Faith comes from hearing. The truth of the revealed
message does not appear to be seen; it has to be believed (non videnda
sed credenda).
27. Summa contra Gentiles 4-1 (Pera no. 3341): "ut firmior esset hominis de
Deo cognitio, quaedam de seipso hominibus revelavit, quae intellectum humanum
excedunt."
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There is a certain order in God's revelation, well suited to human
needs and capacities. The biblical history of revelation shows a ped-
agogical structure of increasing disclosure on God's part. Humanity
advances slowly, gropingly, towards understanding of God. The way
of revelation does not end in faith. Human beings seek to see what
they believe. The biblical revelation points forwards to a future in
which they will be freed from their earthly condition and raised up
to see the truth now only revealed.
Although the way of revelation is consummated in an immediate
knowledge of God, so long as we live on earth the knowledge of
faith cannot completely satisfy our desire to see God. Aquinas gives
two reasons why revealed knowledge fails to satisfy in comparison to
the full knowledge enjoyed by those who see God. First, only a part
of the divine mystery has been revealed in Scripture. Second, this
partial truth has come to us "under certain likenesses and darknesses of
words" ("sub quibusdam similitudinibus et obscuritatibus verborum").
In the obscure sayings of Scripture, the divine mystery is hidden by
veils ("velaminibus occultata"), so that only the studiosi may grasp the
hidden sense behind the surface, the sense that is unaffected by the
mockery of the incredulous.
By describing the way of revelation in contrast to the natural
knowledge of God, on the one hand, and the eschatological vision of
God, on the other hand, Aquinas has now set forth the hermeneutical
and methodological principles for the procedure of book 4- In dealing
with truths of faith revealed by God, one must take the sayings of
Scripture as principles. On the basis of them, one must try one's best
to understand the true sense of what is taught obscurely in Scripture.
One must also defend it against the attempts of the unbelievers to
make it seem ridiculous ("a laceratione infidelium defendendo"). One
should not presume to understand the things of faith perfectly—in
other words, to prove their truth by reducing them to principles
evident in the light of reason. On the contrary, these truths must
be proved by the authority of Scripture. The truth of what faith
professes has its logical basis in the prima veritas, the divine truth
as known by God himself.28 The claims of faith can only be proved
28. As Aquinas notes in 4-1 (Pera no. 3345), the angels and the other beatified
know the divine mysteries in the First Truth, that is the perfect knowledge by which
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from the authoritative expression of the prima υeritas in Scripture,
Nevertheless, it remains to show that the truth of faith is not opposed
to natural reason, so that the Christian faith may be defended "against
the attacks of the unbelievers" ("ab impugnatione infidelium").
Natural reason still has its part to play in book 4. Reason will appear
once again in the encounter with the 'others'. It is not that the truth
of faith as such has to be ascertained by reason, but rather that some,
using reason, have conceived opinions that set up obstacles—may
still set up obstacles—to the process of human understanding and the
expression of the revealed truth. In this respect the "attacks of the
unbelievers" are thought to be dangerous by Aquinas, even when they
are not intended as attacks but as corrections of faith-formulas in the
light of what some take to be truth. These arguments are "attacks" so
far as they attempt to show that the Christian claim to truth cannot
be substantiated. The Christian theologian, acting in the office of
the wise, cannot simply put these attacks aside. After all, they appeal
to the natural human respect for and obligation to truth. They are
dangerous, because wrong ideas about God may cause believers to
direct their lives to the wrong end.
For example, with respect to the "generation" in God of the eternal
Son, certain teachers "presumed to measure this mystery by their own
comprehension of it and conceived various and vain opinions about
it."29 In the views of heretics like Arius and Sabellius, reason has
apparently taken offense at the truth of faith and so has distorted the
mystery by measuring it with its own logic. In these attacks, reason
presumes to correct faith in the light of what it thinks to be the truth
without reflecting critically on its own relation to the truth. To defend
the Catholic faith against these heretical opinions, Aquinas will show
that faith, as articulated and confessed by the Christian Church, is
not impossible in the light of reason.
What does it mean to show that the truth of faith is not impossible
in the light of reason? At first sight it would seem that Aquinas intends
to defend the Catholic faith by refuting reason's various objections.
the divine truth is seen in itself. The imperfect knowledge of faith is derived from
this perfect knowledge.
29. Summa contra Gentiles 4-4 (Pera no. 3358): Ήuius autem doctrinae veritatem
quidam perversi homines suo sensu metiri praesumentes, de praemissis vanas et varias
opiniones conceperunt."
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Reason has to be silenced, since these truths of faith are said to be
outside reason's competence. It seems no wonder, then, that reason
turns into a heretical reason when it tries to understand the mystery
of faith. But in fact the point of Aquinas's discussion of Arius and
Sabellius is rather to argue that reason, faced with the mystery of
faith, need not agree either to keep silent or to become heretical.
In the long development of Catholic orthodoxy, heretical reason
has been defeated successfully by the truth of faith—not silenced
by the political mechanism of ecclesiastical power. The development
of Christian doctrine shows that human reason can correct itself as
it tries to understand and to articulate the mystery of God hinted at
in the obscurities of Scripture.
Catholic orthodoxy is the result of a learning in which the heretical
views of Arius and Sabellius played an important part. The heretics
found it quite contrary to rational truth to accept a "generation"
in God. As Aquinas remarks, human reason, proceeding from the
properties of creatures, experiences difficulties in a great variety of
ways in this secret of divine generation.30 It was because reason
imposed its own categories on the divine mystery, without correcting
these categories in the light of Scripture, that Sabellius and Arius were
led to two opposed errors, the one denying the personal distinction
between the Father and the Son, the other denying the full divinity
of the Son. The Catholic faith, keeping to the middle road,31 holds
with Arius against Sabellius that the Father is distinct in person
from the Son, but with Sabellius against Arius that Christ is true
and natural God, the same in nature as the Father, although not
the same in person. Only the Catholic Church, taught by the texts
of Scripture32 to correct the opposed errors of Arius and Sabellius,
confesses a true "generation" in God. The fact that the Catholic faith
is the middle road is a sign of its truth. "For, as the Philosopher says,
even falsehoods give witness to the truth, for falsehoods stand apart
30. Summa contra Gentiles 4.10 (Pera no. 3446): "humana ratio, ex creaturarum
proprietatibus procedens, multiplicem in hoc secreto divinae generationis patitur
difficultatem."
31. Summa contra Gentiles 4.7 (Pera no. 3426): "Fides ergo catholica, media via
incedens."
32. See Summa contra Gentiles 4.7 (Pera no. 3424): "Ex praemissis igitur et
consimilibus sacra Scripturae documentis Ecclesia catholica docta."
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not only from the truth but from one another." 3 3 The opposed views
of Arius and Sabellius condemned one another as false; the partial
truth in each is saved in the whole truth of the Catholic confession.
The development of Christian doctrine displays a proper rationality
so far as human reason, confronted with its initial onesidedness, is
led by truth itself to correct and transcend its categories in order to
express the higher intelligibility of faith.
What has to be pushed back is the presumption of reason, its
uncritical and unreflective attitude to the truth, and not reason as
such. Reason has to learn, by reflecting on the origin of its categories
in sensible reality, that the truth of faith is not impossible. Aquinas's
use here of a double negation is very striking. At the end of the
chapter in which he sums up the various difficulties and impossibilities
reason experiences with "generation" in God, he concludes that since
truth is strong in itself and cannot be overcome by any attack, his
intention must be to show that the truth of faith cannot be overcome
by reason ("ratίone superari non possίt").3 4 This is a characteristic and
illuminating remark. The next chapter (4.11), in which he carries
out this intention, is most remarkable for its speculative depth and
vision. Here reason learns that its own difficulties concerning divine
"generation" can be overcome when it is brought to acknowledge
that the hierarchical structure of the universe discloses a logic of
perfection and unity that, at its very summit, admits plurality and
distinction. The idea of a hierarchy is used to teach reason that its
conceptual framework is derived from and adapted to a level of being
that shows in itself a dynamic, self-transcending character. By the
33. Summa contra Gentiles 4.7 (Pera no. 3426): "Ex quo etiam indicium veritatis
catholicae sumi potest; nam vero, ut Philosophus dicit, etiam falsa testantur; falsa
vero non solum a veris, sed etiam ab invicem distant."
34. Summa contra Gentiles 4.10 (Pera no. 3460): Ήaec igitur et similia sunt ex
quibus aliqui, divinorum mysteria propria ratione metiri volentes, divinam genera-
tionem impugnare nituntur. Sed, quia veritas in seipsa fortis est et nulla impugnatione
convellitur, oportet intendere ad ostendendum quod veritas ήdei ratione superari non
possit." The idea of an objective truth, which excludes by its force every falsehood,
still requires the rational labor of refuting and dissolving the arguments which are
brought forward against the truth of faith. However powerful by itself, truth can only
become effective within the realm of human life through the medium of reason. That
is why the work of "dissolving" (dissolvere) the arguments which form an obstacle to
the acceptance of the truth is so important to Aquinas.
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very force of truth, reason is compelled to give up its objections- It
has now come to understand that these difficulties are not taken from
the nature of truth itself but from the way reason conceives truths,
"proceeding from the properties of sensible things." T h e development
of the Catholic expression of the truth of faith was at the same time
reason's way of learning of rational reflection and self-correction. In
it human reason is led to acknowledge that it does not establish by
itself the conditions under which it knows the truth. It comes to see
that truth is not constituted by its categories. It grasps, in other words,
that it is a created faculty.3 5
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